The State has lodged a seventeen-ground Amended Notice of Appeal challenging the acquittal and discharge of Ousainou Bojang and Amie Bojang by the High Court. The appeal is set to proceed, subject to the determination of a motion seeking leave to regularise the filing.
The Amended Notice of Appeal, signed and filed by Director of Public Prosecutions A.M. Yusuf on 29 April 2026, contests the entirety of the judgment delivered by Justice Ebrima Jaiteh on 30 March 2026.
In its appeal before the Court of Appeal, the State seeks two principal reliefs: an order setting aside the High Court’s judgment and an order substituting it with convictions and sentences commensurate with the gravity of the offences charged.
The seventeen grounds of appeal challenge the trial judge’s findings across several key areas, including the treatment of confessional evidence, the defence of alibi, identification evidence, digital exhibits, and the overall evaluation of the prosecution’s case.
Regarding the confessional statement of the First Respondent, Ousainou Bojang, admitted as Exhibit P6 following a voir dire, the State argues that the trial judge erred in law by discounting its evidential weight on the basis of an alleged requirement for corroboration. The State maintains that a direct, positive, and unequivocal cautionary statement is sufficient on its own to ground a conviction. It further contends that the First Respondent’s subsequent retraction was an afterthought that ought not to diminish the probative value of the statement.
The State also argues that the trial judge failed to evaluate the confessional statement alongside the unchallenged testimonies of prosecution witnesses, including PW3 and PW13, thereby adopting a selective approach that undermined the proper assessment of the evidence.
On the issue of alibi, the State submits that the trial judge misdirected himself by attaching probative value to a defence raised for the first time during the trial. It argues that established legal principles require an alibi to be raised at the earliest opportunity, preferably during investigation, to allow for verification. The State contends that accepting the belated alibi deprived the prosecution of that opportunity and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, particularly in light of what it describes as compelling evidence linking the First Respondent to the offence.
In relation to identification, the State argues that the trial judge erred by insisting on strict visual identification in line with the principles in R v Turnbull. It submits that the identity of the First Respondent had already been established through other evidence, including his own confessions and the testimonies of multiple witnesses, and that the application of the Turnbull guidelines imposed an unnecessarily high evidential burden.
The State further challenges the trial judge’s treatment of the First Respondent’s flight from the jurisdiction shortly after the incident. It argues that the explanation accepted by the court—that he fled due to a social media incident—was not critically examined against the totality of the evidence. The State maintains that such flight constitutes relevant circumstantial evidence pointing to consciousness of guilt.
On the issue of the weapon used, the State contends that the trial judge wrongly identified inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. It argues that the evidence of key witnesses was consistent in identifying the weapon as a pistol and was corroborated by ballistic evidence confirming it to be a 9mm Makarov pistol.
Several grounds also address the admission and handling of digital and documentary exhibits. The State challenges the admissibility of an audio recording (Exhibit D38), arguing that it lacked proper authentication and that the witness who tendered it had no direct knowledge of its origin or integrity. It also highlights inconsistencies regarding the device used to extract the recording.
With respect to a WhatsApp conversation (Exhibit D37), the State argues that it constituted secondary evidence, as the primary source—the mobile phone—was not produced in court.
The State further questions the authenticity of Africell call log records (Exhibits D16 and D36), noting identical timestamps on the documents and their accompanying certificates, which it argues is procedurally implausible. It also points to an anomalous “High Court” inscription on one of the exhibits as indicative of possible tampering.
In Ground Fourteen, the State contends that the trial judge committed a fundamental error by assessing each piece of evidence in isolation rather than considering the cumulative effect of the prosecution’s case. It argues that this approach is contrary to established legal principles governing the evaluation of evidence.
On the acquittal of the Second Respondent, Amie Bojang, the State submits that the trial judge’s conclusions were directly influenced by the alleged misassessment of the case against the First Respondent. It argues that significant evidence was overlooked, including claims that the Second Respondent facilitated the First Respondent’s escape to Senegal shortly after the incident.
The final ground of appeal asserts that the judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the totality of the evidence.
The State has also reserved the right to file additional grounds upon receipt of the complete record of proceedings.
The appeal will be heard by a three-member panel of the Court of Appeal comprising Presiding Justice N. Salla-Wadda, Justice B.V.P. Mahoney, and Justice A. Saho-Ceesay, pending the determination of the State’s motion to regularise its notice of appeal.
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