High Court Upholds Magistrate’s Ruling, Dismisses Ebrima Dibba’s Appeal in Sedition Case

Justice Sonia Akinbiyi affirms that the Solicitor-General’s statutory authority to act on behalf of the Attorney General’s Office renders a personal fiat unnecessary for the prosecution of sedition charges.

Justice Sonia Akinbiyi of the High Court has dismissed an appeal by Ebrima Dibba challenging a ruling by Principal Magistrate Krubally, affirming that the Solicitor-General, acting within the institutional authority of the Attorney General’s Office, requires no separate personal fiat to prosecute a charge of sedition.

The appeal arose from proceedings before Principal Magistrate Krubally, during which defence counsel Senior Counsel Borry S. Touray argued that a fiat — the personal written consent of the Attorney General — constitutes a mandatory precondition to any prosecution for sedition under the Criminal Code. The prosecution, led by Commissioner Sanneh, contested that position, asserting that the Solicitor-General’s statutory powers rendered such individual authorisation unnecessary.

Magistrate Krubally ruled in favour of the prosecution, prompting Ebrima Dibba to appeal to the High Court. The sole question before Justice Akinbiyi was whether the trial magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the sedition charge in the absence of the Attorney General’s written consent as prescribed by section 53(2) of the Criminal Code.

Before the High Court, Senior Counsel Touray maintained his earlier submissions, arguing that sections 51(1)(a) and 52 of the Criminal Code, read together with section 53(2), make the Attorney General’s personal fiat an indispensable procedural requirement. He further submitted that the Solicitor-General’s conduct of the prosecution without such authorisation was a flagrant breach going to the root of the court’s jurisdiction — one sufficiently fundamental to render all subsequent proceedings a nullity.

The prosecution countered by invoking section 2 of the Law Officers Act, Cap 7:02, which empowers the Solicitor-General to perform all functions of the Attorney General, whether in his absence or under his authority. It maintained that the defence’s interpretation was misconceived and that the appeal was designed to delay substantive proceedings rather than advance a legitimate legal argument.

Justice Akinbiyi agreed with both Magistrate Krubally and the prosecution. In her ruling, she held that while the term “fiat” ordinarily implies express or personal authorisation, statutory provisions conferring broad powers on the Solicitor-General to exercise the functions of the Attorney General are properly construed as a standing authorisation or delegation. Such provisions, she reasoned, obviate the need for a specific, case-by-case fiat in every instance, particularly where the prosecution is conducted under the general institutional authority of the Attorney General’s Office.

Justice Akinbiyi further held that for proceedings to be declared a nullity, any alleged defect must be fundamental and go to the root of the court’s jurisdiction or the charge itself. A procedural irregularity that is curable, or one arising in circumstances where the underlying authority was validly exercised through a lawful delegate, does not automatically vitiate the proceedings.

“On the whole, I find that the defence’s reliance on a strict interpretation of ‘fiat’ overlooks the statutory empowerment of the Solicitor-General,” Justice Akinbiyi stated in her ruling.

She concluded that since the Law Officers Act authorises the Solicitor-General to perform the functions of the Attorney General, a prosecution initiated by the Solicitor-General under the umbrella of the Attorney General’s Office is valid and constitutes prosecution by the Attorney General in law. The sedition charge against Ebrima Dibba was therefore found to carry the standing consent of the Attorney General, and the proceedings were declared valid. In reaching her conclusions, Justice Akinbiyi drew on Nigerian appellate authority, including Okonkwo v. State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 204) 251 and A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia State & Ors (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 677.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed for want of merit. The matter now returns to the Magistrate’s Court, where Ebrima Dibba faces a charge of sedition arising from remarks allegedly made in reference to the President.